Zerstörer Versus Soviet Airborne Operations

A shot down Soviet PS-84 transport plane.

By conducting a large-scale airborne troop landing behind the German lines, the Soviets intended to envelop the German troops. The airborne landing was initiated on January 18 and January 19, when twenty-one PS-84s--license-built American DC-3s--of MAGON GVF carried out forty-eight sorties, thirty-four of them successful, and dropped 642 paratroopers from the 201st Airborne Brigade of 5th Airborne Corps behind German lines in the Ugra area south of Vyazma. The operation continued for five days, and a total of 1,642 troops were landed at the cost to MAGON GVF of six PS-84s, three of them in accidents.

According to a widespread German version of the event, a large portion of these Soviet troops were dropped without parachutes. “Under interrogation, numerous Soviet prisoners testified that they had been flown to the target areas, where they were simply pushed or thrown without parachutes from the planes”, wrote Luftwaffe Oberst Hermann Plocher. In reality, the Soviets—who had pioneered the airborne doctrine (the German paratroopers, the “Green Devils,” were formed on the basis of the Red Army model, and the British, Americans, and others followed duly)—had no reason to take such primitive and brutal measures. The German story possibly originates from the fact that the parachuting was supplemented by troops of the 250th Independent Rifle Regiment that were unloaded from transport planes landing on an improvised airstrip near Plesnyovo in German-held territory. It is also conceivable that captured soldiers of the 250th Independent Rifle Regiment invented this story in order to obscure the location of this airfield.

On January 27 the Soviets renewed the airdrop operation at Vyazma. Thirty-nine PS-84s from MAGON GVF and twenty-five four-engine TB-3s were concentrated to fly General-Mayor Aleksey Levashov’s 4th Airborne Corps behind the German lines. However, the operation, which commenced on January 27, was ill fated from the outset. The 648 paratroopers that were dropped on the first day landed more than ten miles from the intended drop zone and became scattered over a fifteen-mile-wide area. The same day, a Bf 110-reconnaissance plane discovered the departure airbase at Grabtsevo--and shot down a LaGG-3 over the airdrome before returning home with the valuable information. A few hours later, Major Wilhelm Spies’s I./ZG 26 and Major Waldemar Krüger’s II./KG 3 mounted all available aircraft against the airfield. Twelve TB-3s, one Pe-3, and the entire fuel store were destroyed, and the runway was severely damaged. The only German aircraft lost during this mission was the Bf 110 piloted by Major Spies. A veteran from the Spanish Civil War and credited with twenty aerial victories, Knight’s Cross holder Spies was one of the top Zerstörer aces.

During the following days, the airborne troop landing continued in the face of repeated Luftwaffe attacks, while VVS-Western Front directed strong fighter forces to the area. These operations cost a loss of four German fighters on January 29. A total of 2,497 Soviet paratroopers were dropped by February 2.

Without doubt, the VVS proved to be a most serious opponent to the Germans in the central combat zone during January 1942. During that month, the frontal aviation of VVS-Western Front carried out 4,175 combat sorties, while only 666 Luftwaffe sorties were registered in the same area. The frontal aviation of VVS-Western Front claimed twenty German aircraft shot down, and in raids against ground targets, 1,920 vehicles, 64 tanks, 117 railway wagons, and one railway engine were reported as destroyed. In addition, the antiaircraft artillery of the Western Front was credited with shooting down thirty-four enemy aircraft. For these successes, VVS-Western Front registered seventy-four aircraft lost on combat flights--including twenty-four fighters or fighter-bombers, thirteen medium bombers or dive-bombers, seven Il-2s, and thirty biplanes (U-2s, R-5s or R-Zs).

General-Mayor Levashov’s 4th Airborne Corps staged the third large-scale airborne operation behind the German lines at Vyazma on February 17.

The bombers of 1 DBAD, 2 DBAD, 26 DBAD, 42 DBAD, and 133 DBAD were concentrated for the task of isolating the German battlefield by staging intense raids against lines of communications in the area. Other aviation units targeted the Luftwaffe on the ground. VVS-Kalinin Front carried out large-scale attacks against Dugino Airdrome, twenty miles north of Vyazma, on February 18 and February 20. But the increasing presence of German fighters forced the Soviets to launch most of their bombing operations in the hours of darkness, and these missions were characterized by poor organization and a lack of coordination between the DBA and the front and army aviation units. This, in combination with inadequate equipment for night bombing and intense German antiaircraft fire, rendered most bombing missions ineffective. The repeated Soviet air raids against the Orsha Airdrome on February 21 and February 22 only succeeded in putting three Ju 88s of KG 3 and KG 77 out of commission. Nevertheless, the participating aircrews filed unsubtantiated success reports--Polkovnik Yevgeniy Loginov’s 1 DBAD alone claimed to have destroyed forty-two German aircraft on the ground at Orsha, Smolensk, and Vitebsk between January 23 and February 22.

Meanwhile, Fliegerkorps VIII had overcome most problems deriving from the harsh winter conditions, and was brought into successful action against the Soviet attack forces on the ground. Soviet fighters did what they could in this situation--and scored their largest successes against the Bf 110 Zerstörer. Oberleutnant Johannes Kiel of I./ZG 26 recalls a sortie during one of these days:

“The Bolsheviks had no idea from where death appeared. As though struck by lightning, an entire company lay flat in the snow; none of these soldiers would ever rise again. We continued our death-spreading flight. Two horse columns became our next targets, and we tore the horse bodies apart with machine-gun fire. Suddenly there was a cry in the R/T: ‘Enemy fighters to the right!’ There were only two planes, but they attacked us from above. Before we were able to turn around, they had positioned themselves on the tail of our rear aircraft. In the next moment we could see how it started emitting smoke. By that time, I had pulled myself together and was able to evade the second fighter attack. As the two birds of prey attempted to disengage, I took a short cut and overtook one of them. I got the climbing fighter right in front of my nose guns, and my bullets ripped large parts away from its fuselage and wings. Gone and out! Instead of pursuing the other fighter, I decided to see what had happened to my comrades that had been hit. I saw their aircraft just as it belly-landed in a cloud of spraying snow.”

During this period 4./ZG 26 took a heavy beating. On February 18 the Staffelkapitän, Oberleutnant Eduard Tratt, was injured by ground fire, and the following days three of the Staffel’s crews were lost in action. The Zerstörer nevertheless dealt crippling losses to the 4th Airborne Corps on the ground and in the air.

On one of the last transport flights to the Vyazma area, on February 23, a TB-3 of 3 TBAP that was carrying General-Mayor Aleksey Levashov and the entire staff of the 4th Airborne Corps to the landing area came under attack by a Bf 110. A 20mm round hit Levashov. The pilot of the transport plane, Mayor Aleksandr Mosolov, made a rapid forced landing, but Levashov’s life could not be saved. Next day, the airborne assault ended. By then, 7,373 soldiers had been flown into the landing area in 612 aircraft sorties, 443 of which completed the mission successfully.

Five of II./ZG 1’s Bf 110s were shot down during the last five days of February. It seems as though 120 IAP was responsible for quite a large part of the losses suffered by this Zerstörergruppe. On February 28 an Eskadrilya of 120 IAP led by Kapitan Viktor Tomilin intercepted three Bf 110s of II./ZG 1 over the battlefield between Medyn and Vyazma. Tomilin managed to shoot down the leading aircraft while the other two escaped. Later that day another flight of 120 IAP MiG-3s led by Leytenant Sergey Rubtsov attacked a formation of German bombers, possibly He 111s of II./KG 53, escorted by the same Zerstörergruppe. The Soviet fighters attacked head-on and claimed two bombers and a Bf 110 shot down without loss. II./KG 53 filed one He 111 shot down, while both Zerstörer claimed by 120 IAP on this day can be verified with German loss files. On March 1 Leytenant Rubtsov and another pilot of 120 IAP claimed two more II./ZG 1 Bf 110s, both of which can be verified in German loss lists. One week later 120 IAP was adopted as the twelfth VVS Guards aviation regiment.

In spite of a fierce resistance, the Soviet 4th Airborne Corps managed to accomplish its task. By February 28, its troops had advanced thirteen miles to the south and southeast and reached the assigned line where they were supposed to join forces with the Soviet Fiftieth Army. But under the pressure of incessant Luftwaffe attacks the latter force failed to penetrate the German defense and reach connection with the airborne corps. The 4th Airborne Corps had to switch to the defense and would remain fighting in the German rear area for a prolonged period. The German situation in this sector was saved largely due to the Luftwaffe.

The article above consists of material from Volume 2 of Black Cross/Red Star: Air War Over the Eastern Front.